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Abstract: Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing has received considerable attention recently. Empirical 
studies show that when PWYW pricing is implemented buyers do not behave selfishly in a number of cases 
and that some sellers are able to use PWYW to increase turnover as well as profits. In this paper we 
present a theoretical model of buyer behavior under asymmetric information about production costs. Our 
model shows that information asymmetries provide an explanation for the results found in empirical 
studies. 
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1. Introduction 
Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing mechanisms have been granted substantial attention both 
in the literature and in practice recently. PWYW is a form of participative pricing in which 
buyers1 are given the opportunity to determine prices. In contrast to other participative pricing 
mechanisms, such as reverse auctions, PWYW allows buyers to maximize their own utility by 
doing monetary harm to a seller. Contrary to the prediction of traditional economic theory, but in 
line with the experimental results from dictator games, many buyers of products 2  sold via 
PWYW pay positive prices. Sellers, on the other hand, do not seem to be at risk of falling victim 
to selfish buyers. They may even use PWYW pricing in order to attract more buyers and enhance 
revenues as compared to fixed price systems.3
In recent empirical studies buyers’ behavior is interpreted by preferences for fairness, inequity 
aversion, shame, reciprocal behavior, income level of buyers, or moods. The role of information 
asymmetries in PWYW pricing has not been addressed yet. Our goal is to show the importance of 
information asymmetries in the context of PWYW. We outline a theoretical model, which we use 
to show how information asymmetries affect prices paid under a PWYW pricing mechanism. In 
particular, the model reveals that under certain circumstances, PWYW pricing can be profitable 
in the long run. This implies that PWYW can be used not only as a marketing strategy that brings 
a new product or company to the attention of potential customers, but also as a viable long-term 
pricing strategy. 
 
In the second section we briefly summarize the recent literature on PWYW pricing. In section 
three we outline information asymmetries which influence the effectiveness of PWYW pricing 
and provide a model. In section four we discuss some implications of the model and the final 
section concludes. 
                                                        
1 Throughout the text we apply the terms buyer also as a synonym for customer. 
2 For simplicity we speak of goods or products. However, it would be more precise to speak of bundles 
since all goods dealt with in this paper are in fact offered as part of a bundle (e.g., the meal at a restaurant 
consists of, at least, the food, the service, and the atmosphere). 3 Our arguments refer to prices and revenues as most of the empirical literature does. The literature 
provides only limited information about the profitability of different pricing mechanisms for the seller. 
Our arguments refer to production costs only. The cost of using a specific pricing mechanism determines 
the profit as well. PWYW pricing and fixed pricing generate low transaction costs in contrast to individual 
bargaining. 
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2. Review of the Literature 
Kim, Natter, and Spann (2009) pioneered the empirical investigation on PWYW pricing. In three 
short-term field experiments they test the applicability of a PWYW mechanism to different 
goods, a lunch buffet at a restaurant, a movie at a cinema, and a hot beverage at a delicatessen 
(2009: 45). They observe buyers’ behavior in a time-span between three days (cinema) and six 
weeks (delicatessen). Particularly at the cinema, PWYW pricing may be rather problematic, 
while it seems to have positive effects in the restaurant and at the delicatessen (2009: 48). There, 
sellers’ advantage of implementing a PWYW pricing mechanism is an increase in revenues (see 
also Kim, Natter, and Spann 2010a). Other recent studies support the finding that the PWYW 
pricing mechanism may be beneficial for sellers. Riener and Traxler (2012) are the first who test 
a PWYW pricing mechanism in the long run. They analyze buyers’ payments in a restaurant for 
the period of two years and find that despite an average decline of payments, total revenues 
increased. Thus, PWYW pricing may offer a long-term business strategy. 
Assuming rational, selfish and materialistic buyers, the predictive payment in PWYW pricing is 
zero because no minimum threshold price is employed. However, nearly no buyer pays zero. 
Theoretical explanations for the observed behavior can be found in behavioral economics, 
sociology, and psychology. Most theoretical explanations are based on social preferences, such as 
a preference for fairness, reciprocity, or inequity aversion. In addition, the quality of the product, 
buyers’ income levels, and the availability of reference prices affect the prices paid (for a 
discussion on the relevant literature in experimental economics and psychology see Kim, Natter, 
and Spann 2009: 45-48). Results of field experiments indicate that buyers’ fairness perceptions 
and satisfaction with a product positively influence prices paid, i.e. prices at which products are 
sold are higher. Particularly, at the cinema, buyers’ perceived fairness of the price seems to have 
an important influence on prices paid.4
Regner and Barria (2009) investigate the payment behavior of buyers in respect of online music. 
In this case, a positive minimum price and a reference price were provided. They find that, on 
 This finding is remarkable for our aim because we show 
how asymmetric information influences the price that buyers consider as fair. 
                                                        
4 For the cinema they note: “The level of fairness significantly and positively influences prices paid. 
Although the buyers paid only 66% of their reference price to the seller, they believed that they had 
behaved fairly; the survey data show that approximately 90% of the buyers considered a price ≤ € 6 fair.” 
(Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009: 52). 
4  
average, buyers pay more than the price recommended by the seller. They explain their findings 
with the reciprocity, which drives buyers’ decisions (see additionally Regner 2010). Kim, Natter 
and Spann (2010b) emphasize the role of buyers’ reference prices5
Recently, buyer and seller behavior under a PWYW pricing mechanism has also been tackled in 
experimental studies. Schmidt, Spann and Zeithammer (2012) test in their experiments whether it 
is outcome-based social preferences, intention-based reciprocity or self-interest strategic behavior 
that affect buyers’ payment decisions. In a monopoly treatment one seller interacts anonymously 
via a computer with six buyers. The seller decides first whether to offer the product under 
PWYW and later whether to invest in the product. The buyers decide if they want to purchase the 
product and what price to pay after they have been informed about the seller’s marginal costs and 
their own (buyers’) valuation of the product offered. These interactions are repeated for five 
periods. Their results show that there is a high heterogeneity in buyers’ behavior. Positive prices 
paid are in line with the predictions of outcome-based prosocial theories such as altruism and 
inequity aversion. The result that is important for the purpose of our main argument is that fair-
minded buyers paid more when they benefited from the product, or when they were aware of the 
higher costs on the side of the seller. However, participants did not pay higher prices to 
reciprocate for investments undertaken by sellers as intention-based models of reciprocity would 
predict. 
 and find that reference prices 
as well as satisfaction with the product do have an influence on the prices paid. 
Chen, Koenigsberg, and Zhang (2009) investigate the profitability of PWYW in an industry with 
low marginal costs. They show that PWYW can be used as a price discrimination mechanism and 
their theoretical model reveals that zero or low marginal costs is not a precondition for using 
PWYW. In fact, PWYW can be beneficial to sellers as compared to fixed prices when there are 
enough fair-minded customers willing to purchase the product, or when buyers’ willingness to 
pay is rather low. Also, in industries where there is high competition, mainly because of low 
product differentiation, PWYW can bring more revenues to sellers than the traditional pricing 
mechanism.                                                         
5 We use the definition of reference price as a price previously paid by buyers for an identical good or a 
close substitute. We do not distinguish between internal and external reference price since for our purpose 
it is irrelevant whether the reference price has been formed by a buyer’s previous experience with the 
same good or with similar competing goods. 
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Jang and Chu (2012) investigate the role of self-signaling motives and perceived ‘socially 
correct’ actions of buyers’ fairness in PWYW pricing mechanism. For this purpose they asked 
participants about their payment of a range of products (recording album, mobile phone, cake, 
DVD title and canned coffee) offered under PWYW mechanism. Participants were divided into 
control and experimental groups with no, low or average information on the products’ costs. Two 
out of five experiments tested whether it was fairness motives or self-signaling which makes 
buyers pay more. They found that buyers paid more when informed about the seller’s costs, 
which shows that byers care about seller’s costs and fairness perceptions do influence buyers’ 
behavior. The results also revealed that when faced with higher seller’s costs and the 
understanding that appearing fair will require considerate payment, buyers were still willing to 
pay less in spite of the awareness that they would incur losses to the seller. This implies that self-
signaling motives are stronger than fairness ones. In the other three experiments participants were 
given hints about ‘fair’ prices or other buyers’ payment behavior. Jang and Chu found that clues 
about “socially correct” actions also affect buyers’ behavior in PWYW. Buyers paid more when 
hinted that most of their peers behaved fairly and decreased the prices paid when realized the 
others behaved selfishly. 
The effects of external reference prices - such as minimum, maximum or recommended prices - 
were investigated by Johnson and Cui (2012). The authors asked undergraduate students about 
the price they would pay on a hypothetical purchasing scenario of concert tickets offered under 
PWYW. Participants in experimental groups were given information about a minimum or 
maximum accepted price or a recommended price. Analyzing the results from four field 
experiments, Johnson and Cui found that providing external reference prices in PWYW may shift 
buyers’ paying behavior toward the provided prices, i.e. these external reference prices may act 
as an anchor on the prices paid. More interestingly, Johnson and Cui find that sellers’ profits are 
the highest if no reference price is provided. A minimum recommended price decreases the prices 
paid. On the contrary, a maximum recommended price may work as a price-ceiling which 
influences negatively the average price paid of those buyers who are willing to pay high prices. 
In contrast to the above computer and laboratory experiments, León, Noguera, and Tena-Sánchez 
(2012) conduct a field experiment with PWYW pricing for holiday packages in Spain. In the 
experiment the buyers exhibit a much stronger selfish behavior in comparison to previous studies. 
They pay only 5.1% of the value of the products (2012: 395). León, Noguera, and Tena-Sánchez 
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try to explain the results by buyers’ preferences and by framing effects. In line with the results of 
this field experiment we offer a possible alternative explanation below. We consider information 
asymmetries between buyers and sellers, an aspect which has not been specifically addressed in 
the above mentioned literature. 
 
3. Information Asymmetries in PWYW Pricing 
As Kim, Natter and Spann (2009) show, PWYW pricing is a pricing strategy which is suitable for 
some goods but not for others. They outline that fairness perceptions are important for prices paid 
by buyers. Here, we offer a more conventional economic explanation and a model and we argue 
that information asymmetries influence prices paid under PWYW pricing.6
Our argument is related to information asymmetries with respect to production costs. Let us 
assume a not-completely-selfishly motivated buyer who follows individual fairness perceptions 
when asked to pay for a product which she has consumed or will consume. As a consequence, she 
may pay (within a PWYW pricing mechanism) a price which she considers fair according to her 
set of information.
 We contend that the 
‘observability’ of fixed and marginal costs can influence buyers’ payment decisions. 
7
Let us provide an example: restaurant visitors have, in most cases, a fairly good experience in 
 However, if she has incomplete information about the cost function of the 
seller, the price which she perceives as fair may be too low or too high (or, more precisely, higher 
or lower than the price the buyer would pay if she had complete information about production 
costs). Note that information asymmetries cannot be solved by reference prices because without 
information about cost, buyers have no information in order to judge the fairness of the reference 
price. And if buyers assume that the reference price is the fair price, the fair price will be 
distorted unless the reference price accurately reflects the seller’s costs. 
                                                        
6 Our explanation does not depend on buyer heterogeneity in reservation prices. In our model, we compare 
the price paid by a buyer with complete and incomplete information, and the price based on the seller’s 
cost. In other words, we look at individual transactions, which give rise to profits or losses. Of course, 
there can be buyers who are heterogeneous with respect to their willingness-to-pay (WTP) or their fairness 
preferences. In this case, the profitability of each individual transaction depends on a buyer’s WTP and 
fairness preferences, and the seller’s total profit is given by the sum of profits over all transactions. 
Whether PWYW is profitable depends on the distribution of WTP and fairness preferences. 
7 A seller’s cost is only one out of several determinants of price fairness. For a review of price fairness 
perceptions, see Xia et al. (2004). 
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how much the price of ingredients are, how much labor is required to prepare a meal and how 
much approximately the rent for a restaurant in a given area could be. So they may have a 
reasonable guess about the overall costs of running a restaurant and preparing a meal. Restaurant 
visitors are able to calculate a price which can cover part of the costs and which they perceive as 
fair. Quite in contrast to the case of a restaurant visit, a buyer who goes to the cinema is rather 
unable to calculate the costs which the owner of a cinema faces when showing a movie. Buyers 
are normally unable to provide an educated guess about the fixed costs for running a cinema, e.g. 
monthly rent, capital costs, costs for renting movies, etc. However, buyers are able to observe 
that the marginal cost for a visitor in a cinema is zero – as long as capacity utilization is below 
100%. The general ‘observability’ of production costs in one case and the ‘unobservability’ of 
production costs in the second case lead to different results when buyers are asked to pay under a 
PWYW mechanism.8
To illustrate the importance of information about production costs, assume that a risk neutral 
representative buyer knows the seller’s cost structure, i.e., she is aware of the fixed costs, F, and 
marginal costs, MC, which are constant. The buyer’s willingness to pay (the maximum price she 
is willing to pay) is given by WTP. For simplicity we assume a buyer whose WTP exceeds the 
seller’s unit costs, UC, which are given by UC = F/N + MC (N is the scale of production).
 In fact, a PWYW mechanism is likely to improve revenues and profits if 
information asymmetries are low on the side of buyers and the same mechanism may lead to 
contrary results if information asymmetries are high. The latter applies only if the price regarded 
as fair by a buyer is too low with respect to costs, which is most likely to happen when fixed 
costs of production are relatively high. If this is not the case and the price considered as fair is 
higher than the costs, the seller should have an interest in preserving information asymmetries. 
The problematic case from the perspective of the seller is the first one, where buyers consider a 
price as fair that is lower than production costs. 
9
                                                        
8 In the case of the restaurant, the price buyers consider to be fair may coincide with the reference price. In 
the case of the cinema, the price considered as fair is lower than the reference price if buyers 
underestimate fixed costs. 
 The 
gains from trade are given by the difference between WTP and UC, WTP - UC > 0. Assume that 
the buyer who is not completely selfish is willing to split the gains from trade so that her own 
share is q (with 0 < q < 1) and the seller’s share is (1-q). Then, the price perceived as fair in the 
9 In the text we model the simplest case. For further cases, in which the WTP is smaller than the seller’s 
unit cost, see the Appendix. 
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complete information case is given by 
𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = (1 − 𝑞)𝑊𝑇𝑃 + 𝑞 𝑈𝐶 = (1 − 𝑞)𝑊𝑇𝑃 + 𝑞 �𝐹
𝑁
+ 𝑀𝐶�. 
Now assume that the buyer has only incomplete information about fixed costs, which are low 
(FL) with probability r (with 0 < r < 1) and high (FH) with probability (1-r). F is replaced by the 
expected value E(F) = r FL+ (1-r) FH, and the price which the buyer considers a fair price is (in 
the incomplete information case) given by 
𝑝(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒  𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = (1 − 𝑞)𝑊𝑇𝑃 + 𝑞 �𝑟𝐹𝐿 + (1 − 𝑟)𝐹𝐻
𝑁
+ 𝑀𝐶�. 
Assuming that fixed costs are high (𝐹 = 𝐹𝐻), the difference between both prices is 
𝛥𝐻 ≡  𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) −  𝑝(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒  𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝑞𝑟𝑁 (𝐹𝐻 − 𝐹𝐿) > 0, 
and assuming that fixed costs are low (𝐹 = 𝐹𝐿), the difference between both prices is 
𝛥𝐿 ≡  𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) −  𝑝(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒  𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝑞(1 − 𝑟)𝑁 (𝐹𝐿 − 𝐹𝐻) < 0. 
If fixed costs are high (or low) but buyers have incomplete information about them, they 
underestimate (or overestimate) the costs. Hence, with asymmetric information about fixed costs 
and fixed costs being high, PWYW pricing results in lower revenue and profits (compared to the 
situation in which buyers and sellers have symmetric information). 
For given q and r, the difference in revenue will depend on the scale of production, N, and the 
difference FH-FL. The latter can be interpreted as a proxy for uncertainty, which means that with 
increasing uncertainty, PWYW pricing is less likely to increase revenue. Regarding the scale of 
production, it follows that if production takes place on a larger scale (higher N), it is more likely 
to increase revenues, because a larger scale allows for fixed costs to be covered by a larger 
number of units sold. 
The model can be extended to incorporate uncertainty with respect to the scale of production, N. 
Assume that buyers have incomplete information about N, and let the buyer’s estimate be given 
by . If buyers underestimate the scale of production,  will be higher and will be lower. 
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If buyers overestimate the scale of production,  will be lower but will remain positive and 
will be higher but will remain negative. Hence, uncertainty regarding the scale of production does 
not affect our main result: With fixed costs being high and buyers having incomplete information 
about the cost structure, the price that buyers consider as fair is below the unit cost. 
Note that the argument above relies solely on the amount of information that buyers have about 
the seller’s cost structure. This does not imply that fairness considerations are unimportant, but it 
shows that in addition to fairness the distribution of information is a crucial variable for 
explaining the success or failure of PWYW pricing. Indeed, in order to allow buyers to realize 
their preference for fairness, they need information about production costs. 
 
4. Implications of the model 
One can pose the question why fix costs should matter at all. According to the standard 
microeconomic theory, fix costs are sunk costs and should not matter at all. A profit-maximizing 
seller should set her price equal to marginal costs, so that the profit-maximizing price is 
determined by the intersection of the upward-sloping marginal cost curve and the downward-
sloping demand curve. Contrary to this theoretical prediction, a large number of sellers employ 
full cost pricing (Govindarajan and Anthony 1983; Shim and Sudit 1995). 
Full cost pricing can be difficult, however. The experimental evidence in Bolton et al. (2003) 
indicates that buyers overestimate profits and underestimate costs. Hence, a reference price might 
not be a good signal for costs. Although dual entitlement theory (Kahneman et al. 1986) suggests 
that a seller is entitled to profits and buyers are entitled to buy a good at a certain price, buyers 
perceive the price as unfair if they perceive profits as being too high. This perceived exploitation 
can be reduced by making costs more noticeable (cf. Bolton et al. 2003). With more information 
the seller’s claim to a share of the surplus becomes more salient. Since buyers are not obliged to 
pay a positive price in a PWYW pricing mechanism, seller’s entitlement is not a legal but a 
morally perceived right (Gächter and Riedl 2005). 
Similar fairness considerations to price changes are studied by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 
(1986) who show that buyers perceive a price increase as fair if higher prices reflect higher costs 
but perceive higher prices as unfair if they reflect excess demand. Put bluntly, the perception of 
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buyers is that sellers are entitled to a higher price and buyers have a moral obligation to pay a 
higher price if costs are high. 
The motivations for paying a ‘fair’ price are preferences for fairness and self-image concerns. 
The effect of information about costs on entitlements is comparable to the notion that buyers pay 
a positive price in order to maintain a positive self-image (Gneezy et al. 2012). Viewed from this 
perspective, one can argue that the loss in a buyer’s utility from paying too little increases with 
the strength of the seller’s entitlement. In other words, the more information buyers have about 
sellers’ costs, the stronger the sellers’ entitlement is and the larger the buyers’ losses in utility are 
from violating fairness and acting selfishly. 
Empirical evidence is collected by Jang and Chu (2012) and Schmidt, Spann and Zeithammer 
(2012), who investigate PWYW pricing using laboratory experiments. Jang and Chu (2012, 
experiment 2a) show that more information about costs increases PWYW prices and argue that 
the rationale behind this is that buyers do not want to hurt sellers because doing it would result in 
a bad feeling. Schmidt, Spann and Zeithammer (2012) find that buyers are willing to pay higher 
prices as higher production costs (known to buyers) lead to an increase of buyers’ valuations for 
the good. 
The major argument of the preceding analysis is that the success of PWYW pricing depends on 
buyers’ information about costs. A question that immediately comes to mind concerns the 
implications for sellers: How can sellers credibly signal their cost to buyers? From a theoretical 
perspective, this is a signaling problem where sellers have are of different types and signal their 
true type. Telling buyers about the costs would be one way to send a signal, but this would be 
nothing but cheap talk. Another possible way to send a credible signal about costs is to inform 
buyers about the quality of the product by using product certification  Product certification is a 
credible signal of quality, and quality is a credible signal of the product’s costs. 
The case presented in this paragraph reveals that buyers consider a price as fair if the seller’s 
profit is not too high. Profits tend to be overestimated, however this tendency can be reduced if 
information about costs is more salient. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown the importance of information asymmetries as an explanation for 
which products the PWYW pricing mechanism may be a viable alternative to traditional fixed 
pricing. This aspect has not been mentioned in previous interpretations of empirical findings on 
PWYW pricing and can complement existing models. In particular we find, that, first, if fixed 
costs are high, PWYW is more likely to be successful if buyers are informed about seller’s fixed 
costs because if they have such information, the price they will pay reflects costs. This implies 
that for sellers with high fixed costs PWYW can only be a success if the information asymmetry 
is low, i.e., if buyers have information about fixed costs. Second, buyers’ expectations about 
fixed costs (i.e., the parameters FH, FL, and r, or more generally, the distribution of fixed costs) 
matter for what they perceive as a fair price. The larger the range of the distribution of fixed costs 
(FH - FL) or the larger the probability that fixed costs are low (r), the lower the price which a 
buyer is willing to pay. Third, information asymmetries are less important if the scale of 
production is large (e.g., buying hot beverages at a delicatessen) or if there is no capacity 
constraint at all (e.g., online music). The first two implications concern the distribution of 
information about production costs and reveal that PWYW is more suitable for products for 
which buyers have information about costs. The third implication concerns the scale of 
production and reveals that PWYW is more suitable for products produced on a large scale. 
We demonstrated that the (un)observability of production costs10
 
 and of quality can influence the 
price a buyer is willing to pay for a good. The (un)observability of production costs as well as of 
quality are problems which may cause market failure or moral hazard, both being suboptimal for 
sellers. Thus, they do deserve attention in the currently evolving debate on PWYW pricing 
mechanism. This contributes to gaining more insights into the important question about the types 
of products, for which PWYW is a suitable pricing mechanism. 
 
 
                                                        
10 Since production costs of holiday packages are difficult to observe, the rather selfishly oriented behavior 
of customers reported by León, Noguera, and Tena-Sánchez (2012) fits into our explanation. 
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Appendix 
Section 3 shows the effect of buyers’ information asymmetries on prices, revenues and profits in 
a PWYW pricing mechanism. With asymmetric information and fixed costs being high, the price 
regarded as fair by buyers is too low with respect to production costs. In this situation it is in the 
seller’s interest to inform buyers about costs. In the opposite case, in which fixed costs are low 
and fair prices are too high compared to costs, preserving the information asymmetry is in the 
seller’s interest. In both situations it is assumed that buyers’ WTP (maximum willingness to pay) 
exceeds product’s unit costs (UC) so there can be a positive gain from trade (WTP - UC > 0), 
which is split between the seller and the non-selfish buyer. 
The assumption of WTP exceeding unit costs restricts the analysis to two cases. In this section we 
relax this assumption and consider other possible cases. Denoting the seller’s real unit cost by 
𝑈𝐶𝑟 and the unit cost as perceived by the buyer by 𝑈𝐶𝑝 = �𝑟𝐹𝐿+(1−𝑟)𝐹𝐻𝑁 + 𝑀𝐶�, the six cases are: 
 1. UCp < UCr < WTP  4. UCp < WTP < UCr 
 2. UCr < UCp < WTP  5. WTP < UCp < UCr 
 3. UCr < WTP < UCp  6. WTP < UCr < UCp 
 
In the above discussed cases 1 and 2 the buyer buys the good and pays (1 − 𝑞) 𝑊𝑇𝑃 + 𝑞 𝑈𝐶𝑝.  
In case 3, perceived unit costs by buyers are higher than average WTP, which in turn is higher 
than the product’s real unit costs. If buyers know the real unit costs, they will pay a perceived fair 
price of (1-q) WTP + q UCr, which is lower than the WTP but higher than real unit costs, thus 
increasing revenue and profit. With asymmetric information, however, the increase in revenue 
and profit will be even larger since buyers overestimate unit costs and pay a higher price. In this 
case, it is in the seller’s interest to preserve information asymmetries.  
In case 4, the products’ real unit costs are higher than WTP, despite the fact that buyers regard 
that the costs as lower than the maximum price they are willing to pay. In this case, with 
asymmetric information, the price buyers will pay lies between the WTP and the perceived unit 
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cost but below real unit cost so that the seller will make a loss. And if sellers inform buyers about 
the product’s real unit costs, PWYW pricing makes no sense. Buyers who care about fairness will 
not be willing to pay the fair price (1-q) WTP + q UCr because if they would, the seller would 
suffer losses. They would refrain from buying since the fair price exceeds their WTP. Buyers 
who do not care about fairness will pay a price lower or equal to their WTP, i.e., a price that is 
below costs. Thus, with asymmetric information and with symmetric information the price paid 
by buyers is below the seller’s unit cost, resulting in losses. In this case, PWYW pricing 
mechanism is not advisable since generated revenues will not exceed production costs. 
In cases 5 and 6 an average buyer’s WTP is lower than both real and perceived unit costs. In 
these cases the price buyers consider as fair is lower than the cost of production, 𝑈𝐶𝑟. As in case 
4 with symmetric information, fair buyers will not buy the good and selfish buyers will buy at a 
price below cost. This holds regardless of buyers’ information about fixed costs. PWYW pricing 
mechanism should not be used in these cases since revenues will be lower than costs, resulting in 
a loss for the seller. 
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